Julia Tanney’s Meaning, Mind, and Action challenges widely held presuppositions within philosophy in its classical ‘analytic’, ‘naturalist’, and ‘cognitivist’ forms. Beginning with canonical views in the philosophy of language and logic, the arguments are then applied to discussions of knowledge, action, causation, the nature of the mental, consciousness, and thinking. Responding to a tradition that harks back to Plato and was resurrected by Mill, Frege, Russell, Moore, and the early Wittgenstein, Meaning, Mind, and Action challenges today’s orthodoxy on its own terms, beginning with canonical views in the philosophy of language and philosophical logic. The arguments of these early chapters are then applied to the theory of knowledge, action, and causation, followed by those on the nature of the mental, consciousness, and thinking. The final section, on the logic of the mental, widens the arguments to include the subject of animal minds, the postulation of mental representations in cultural anthropology, the author’s intention in literary theory, and the philosophical problem of irrationality in psychiatry.