The New Order was the term the Japanese, German and Italian governments used for their expansive strategies and spheres of influence during the eve and course of the Second World War. Their attack against the status quo was initiated by Japan occupying Manchuria, preceding Hitler's rise to power. Subsequently, Italian aggression against Ethiopia shows that the first military adventures of the emerging New Order occurred outside Europe. A main issue in this account is the lack of coordination between the German and Japanese approaches toward the USSR. Consequently the Anti-Komintern-Pact, an overwhelmingly ideological cover-up, implied meager strategic significance. The Tripartite Treaty, on the contrary, provided Germany with some East European allies in its warfare against the USSR. In contrast to Germany and Japan, the Italian military performance was in all the stages of the Second World War so poor, that Mussolini's Fascism was downgraded to a humiliating position within the New Order. The author concludes that the common strategy came to naught due to different interests and mentalities. Fascist internationalism proved to be a sheer impossibility.