This dissertation addresses the particularities of the European economic governance system, uncovering reasons for the emergence of different modes of cooperation. Why are some economic policies, such as business taxation, regulated by soft forms of coordination, whereas monetary policy is subject to a supranational mode of governance? Building on a discursive institutionalist approach, the book draws attention to the role of issue-specific knowledge and political communication in the EU. Even though previous research endeavors in this field have contributed to a better understanding of how ideas and communication facilitate the emergence of a consensus among supranational elites, they neglect addressing reasons for the emergence of different modes of European cooperation. The book addresses this shortcoming and investigates the particularities of European economic governance, based on a comparative case study of business taxation and monetary policy. It shows that reform ideas are crucial for the emergence of different governance outcomes, as they determine whether a reform is perceived as relevant and feasible at all. Moreover, the findings reveal several particularities of European political communication. Market-liberal reforms are generally at an advantage in the decision-making process as more intervention requires a broader consensus, which can be difficult in a Union with heterogeneous political cultures and governments. Furthermore, the public discourse is dominated by the Commission's official agenda which fails to offer left- and right-wing policy alternatives. However, this appears to be a crucial element to tackle problems of economic policy frustration and to create a more sustainable and legitimate European Community. Dissertation. (Series: Schriften zur europaischen Arbeits- und Sozialpolitik - Vol. 8)