discusses how any country, including the US, has a range of instruments, short of force, at its disposal by which it may project power in pursuit of its diplomatic objectives. The use of the instruments is subject to domestic and international constraints and, particularly in the case of the US, its global position must also be considered. This is a fascinating and rigorous study of how, from 1991, the US projected its power to attain its declared objective of a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute, yet despite these efforts, failed to achieve it. The author reveals the disinclination of Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush to employ all the means available to them, and discontinuities in their approaches, which resulted in an ineffective projection of power during their presidencies to 2006. This analysis reveals measures that could be applied for a more effective projection of state power in relation to the Middle East dispute and also in other circumstances around the globe. This book's penetrating analysis and lessons to be learnt from the US experience in relation to the Arab-Israel dispute, will appeal strongly to scholars and practitioners in international relations, political science, and diplomacy.