This thesis analyzes the current intelligence reform initiatives in light of multiple recommendations from post-9/11 commissions tasked with studying intelligence shortcomings. Using North Korea as a case study, it examines how reform efforts will increase capabilities to better understand Pyongyang's WMD programs and affect U.S. strategy on North Korea. Three reform sets should significantly improve U.S. understanding of North Koreas WMD programs. Collection reforms should allow intelligence agencies to gather more information to gain increased insight into Pyongyangs WMD programs. Analysis reforms will develop alternative methods and create streamlined procedures to avoid failures such as those witnessed in Iraq. Collaboration reforms should enable the Intelligence Community to shed its stovepipe mentality, facilitating unity of effort in reducing intelligence gaps on North Koreas dangerous programs. Intelligence reform, while necessary, is insufficient to deal with the North Korean threat. An engagement strategy could help the Intelligence Community better understand North Korea and its WMD programs by bringing Pyongyang into the international fold and lowering its isolationist tendencies. Engagement could increase intelligence collection opportunities and give decisionmakers more relevant information yielding better decisions and improved counterproliferation efforts. Finally, ongoing reforms should better equip policymakers to tackle broader issues such as terrorism and counterproliferation.