The American public generally admired the ideals of Jewish settlement in the Holy Land. Americans considered the Jewish pioneers as missionaries of progress who were repeating U.S. history by displacing "backward" natives and improving the land. Of course, religious fundamentalists in the United States saw the Jewish return to the Promised Land as a fulfillment of prophecy. In the realm of official policy, President Roosevelt, even after meeting with King Ibn Saud at Great Bitter Lake, never appreciated the depth of convictions surrounding the Palestine controversy and was hopelessly inconsistent on the subject. Truman, beleaguered by domestic and foreign crises, had no clear conception of what policies he wanted, was unable to make hard decisions about Palestine, and often could not remember what he had already done on the matter. The State Department, early opponents of any policy that would alienate the Arabs, became the first U.S. policy agency to support the creation of a small Jewish state as a compromise the Arabs would accept. As a result of these confused policies the United States failed to work with the world community to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. This book will be of interest to all students of Middle East affairs, the Truman administration, and Jewish history as well as anyone concerned with the history of U.S. diplomacy.